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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:
MANAGING ITS CASELOAD
TO ACHIEVE ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR. *
INTRODUCTION
N his persistent and innovative efforts to improve the administra-
tion of justice, Chief Justice Burger has invited public debate about
the effect of the Supreme Court's rising caseload on the quality of
judicial decision-making.' Because Justice Holmes once reminded us
that justice and high judicial performance require the company of the
bench and the bar acting in concert,2 commentary from a practicing
member of the bar seems appropriate. Thus, in the spirit of the Chief
Justice's invitation, this Article will (1) discuss the Supreme Court's
excessive workload, (2) survey solutions that have been proposed,
primarily by other Justices, and (3) suggest an alternative that may be
more consistent with the Court's historic traditions and basic constitu-
tional purposes. This issue transcends the workload question itself; it
goes to the essence of the Supreme Court's responsibilities during the
next two hundred years of our constitutional democracy. The solution
chosen will affect the quality of the Court's contribution to efficient
but fair justice and to economic growth with enhanced productivity.
Indeed, it will determine how successfully the Court can fulfill the
* A.B. summa cum laude University of Pennsylvania, 1941; LL.B. magna cum
laude Harvard Law School, 1946 as of 1943; law clerk to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich,
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, May 1947 to August 1948; law
clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter, 1948 Term; Secretary of Transportation in Presi-
dent Ford's Administration (1975-1977); senior partner of O'Melveny & Meyers of
Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, California and Paris, France; member of the Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers; Chairman, NAACP Legal and Educational Defense
Fund, Inc.; Trustee, Brookings Institution, The Rand Corporation, The Carnegie
Institution of Washington, The Urban Institute; and Trustee and Vice President,
Philadelphia Museum of Art. This article is adapted from the Thirteenth Annual
John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture, delivered by Mr. Coleman at the Fordham
University School of Law on May 9, 1983. Donald T. Bliss, also a partner of
O'Melveny & Meyers, contributed greatly to the preparation of this Article.
1. Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69
A.B.A.J. 442, 446 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
2. Address by Justice Holmes, Suffolk Bar Association Dinner (February 5,
1885), reprinted in M. Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes 29-31 (1943);
see P. Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 78-79 (1950).
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constitutional goal of maximizing, as Justice O'Connor said in Kolen-
der v. Lawson, "individual freedoms within a framework of ordered
liberty." 3
The Court's excessive workload presents an immediate and serious
problem which, if not resolved, will erode the quality of decision-
making of the nation's highest tribunal. More importantly, it will
deflate the Court's leavening influence in this diverse, vibrant, and
contentious democracy. Many of the solutions being discussed, how-
ever, would unnecessarily alter the core responsibilities of the Su-
preme Court. Establishment of a national appellate court,4 for exam-
ple, would unwisely delegate the Supreme Court's final authority to
decide certain cases or, equally troubling, to select cases for Supreme
Court review. Similarly, the selection of a rotating panel of judges
from the thirteen federal appellate courts to review conflicts among
the circuits, would interpose a new level of review and address only
part of the problem.
The alternative proposed in this Article consists of four interrelated
reforms, each of which would strengthen the Court's ability to iden-
tify and decide legal issues of fundamental national importance while
optimizing the use of its valuable time. The reforms would: (1) make
the Court's appellate jurisdiction entirely discretionary except in cer-
tain rare instances where a constitutional challenge involves the denial
of fundamental human rights in a way that is the cause of nationwide
divisiveness,6 (2) resolve most inter-circuit conflicts without any Su-
preme Court involvement in the process, (3) limit Supreme Court
review to issues of fundamental national importance, and (4) reinvig-
orate the traditions of judicial restraint, disciplined opinion writing,
and deferential collegiality epitomized by the contributions to prior
Courts of, among others, Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Holmes,
Frankfurter, and Brandeis.
These reforms would not only reduce the pressures of the Court's
burgeoning caseload but would also regenerate the principal source of
its strength-the ability to fashion collegially, with the power of
reason alone, the fabric of a just and free society. In this sense, the
Supreme Court is a microcosm of a diverse and dynamic populace, the
fragile unity of which rests on respect for law and the resolution of
disputes through reason. It is the legal system that avoids bitter frac-
3. Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983).
4. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
6. Cases reviewable under such jurisdiction would involve rights such as those
presented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion), and Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal educational opportunity). The precise definition
of this narrow right of mandatory appeal will require further research, debate and
refinement.
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tionalization by transforming the tensions of a pluralistic society into
creative progress toward a more workable civilization. The Court
must resolve-or justify-the disparate perspectives of its members
through reason and explain its evolving consensus with clarity, force,
and detached analysis. Review of some facts and history regarding the
Supreme Court's workload will place the issue in perspective and
explain why the alternative proposed herein is fully consistent with
both the Court's traditions and its constitutional mandate.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY REGARDING SUPREME COURT CASELOAD
A. Statistical Analysis
The increasing burden of the Supreme Court's workload is amply
demonstrated by various statistical analyses cited by the Justices them-
selves.7 The Chief Justice, for example, recently noted that in 1953,
the first year of Chief Justice Warren's tenure, the Court had 1,463
cases on its docket and issued 65 signed opinions." In the Term ending
July 1982, the Supreme Court had 5,311 cases on its docket and issued
141 signed Court opinions.9 This amounts to a docket increase of 270
7. Justice Brennan recently noted that during the 1981 Term, the Supreme
Court "granted review in 210 cases, which is 26 more than the Term before and 56
more than two Terms ago." Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's
Workload, 66 Judicature 230, 230 (1983) (quoting Justice White) [hereinafter cited as
Brennan I]. The Justice noted that "for more than 15 of [his] 26 terms starting in
1956, the Court averaged about 100 opinions per term .... But since the 1970 term
that number has inexorably crept up, first to the high 120's, then to the 130's and last
term to 141 signed [opinions] plus 9 per curiam [opinions]." Id. In his assessment of
the workload crisis facing the federal judiciary, Justice Powell observed that "[c]ivil
rights filings in federal district courts have increased from about 270 in 1961 to some
30,000 in fiscal year 1981. Powell, Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?,
68 A.B.A.J. 1370, 1371 (1982). Justice O'Connor has noted that in the 1935 Term
there were 983 new filings, by 1951 the number had grown to 1,234, and during the
1981 Term there were 4,422 new filings in the Supreme Court. O'Connor, Com-
ments on Supreme Court's Case Load, Joint Meeting of the Fellows of the American
Bar Foundation & the National Conference of Bar Presidents, at 7 (Feb. 6, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Comments of Justice O'Connor] (available in files of Fordham
Law Review).
8. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 42. "Signed" opinions do not include concur-
ring, dissenting or per curiam opinions. Id. at 443 n. 1; see infra note 17.
9. Id. at 442. Some commentators have pointed out that "the statistical rise in
applications does not create a proportionate rise in demand on the Justice's time in
reviewing applications." Alsup, A Policy Assessment of The National Court of Ap-
peals, 25 Hastings L.J. 1313, 1320 (1974). This is because the increase in applications
is largely due to in forma pauperis cases which are often readily indentifiable as
frivolous. Id. at 1320-21; Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent,
40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 473, 476-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brennan II]; Gressman,
Much Ado About Certiorari, 52 Geo. L.J. 742, 745-46 (1964); Comment, The
National Court of Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality, and Desirability, 41
Fordham L. Rev. 863, 864-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Composition, Constitution-
1983]
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percent and more than a doubling of signed opinions.' 0 In the Term
ending July 6, 1983, the Court issued 151 signed opinions.I
During Chief Justice Burger's tenure, Congress has created over one
hundred new statutory causes of action. 12 The Court itself, although
to a lesser extent, has also created new causes of action.'3 Further
evidence of the growing litigiousness of the American public lies in the
number of licensed attorneys, which has almost doubled since the
early 1970's, and the number of federal judges, which has increased
over the past 30 years from 279 to 647.14 It is these attorneys and
judges who "produce the grist for the Supreme Court 'mill',"u s yet the
number of Supreme Court Justices has remained at nine since 1869.16
Other statistics, not as commonly cited, tell a different story. There
actually has not been an increase over the long term in the total
number of opinions of the Court. In 1882, for example, there were
260; in 1932, there were 168; and in 1982, there were 151.17 There has
ality, and Desirability]; see Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, A Dissenting View, 67 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 842, 846 (1973).
10. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 442. Of course, it is the lower federal courts,
as well as the states' court systems, that fuel the oversized Supreme Court docket.
Justice Rehnquist recently illustrated this by noting that in 1937 there were 155
federal district court judges and 46 judges of the federal courts of appeals. Remarks
by Justice Rehnquist, Mac Swinford Lecture, University of Kentucky, at 10 (Sept. 23,
1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). Today there are 515 federal
district court judges and 132 federal appellate judges. Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1982, at 77, 96 [hereinafter
cited as Administrative Office Report].
11. See Appendix, Chart II. Nearly one-third of these opinions were issued
during the final three weeks of the Term. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1983, § 1 at 1, col. 2.
12. Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1983, at A12, col. 1.
13. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 442-443; see, e.g., Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979) (implied right of action for injunctive relief
under § 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (implied damage action
under the fourth amendment). For a discussion of the recent developments in the
area of implied rights of action, see Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal
Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regula-
tion, and Beyond, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1333 (1980); Note, Implied Private Rights of
Action Under Federal Statutes: Congressional Intent, Judicial Deference, or Mutual
Abdication?, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 611 (1982).
14. Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1983, at A12, col. 1.
15. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 443.
16. Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 4. Increasing the number of
Justices on the Supreme Court would arguably create more problems than it would
solve by exacerbating the already difficult task of reaching a consensus.
17. See Appendix, Chart I. The 1882 figure, however, is somewhat misleading.
As Chief Justice Burger has said recently, "[i]f the Court had been authorized to
exercise discretionary certiorari jurisdiction in 1882, probably half of what were
described in 1882 as 'cases' would have been denials of certiorari," and hence orders
rather than opinions. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 443. Moreover, the figures
cited here include only signed opinions and not per curiam opinions, which currently
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been a dramatic increase, however, in the number of concurring
opinions-4 in 1882, 4 in 1932, and 70 in 1982; and the number of
dissenting opinions-17 in 1882, 24 in 1932, and 144 in 1982.18 Stated
another way, in 1882, there were 242 unanimous decisions (93.08
percent of the total); in 1932, there were 133 (79.64 percent of the
total); and in 1982, there were 34 (22.52 percent of the total). 19 Since
the advent of the Warren Court in 1953, the total number of opinions
per Term, including concurring and dissenting opinions, has risen
from 138 to 361 .20 Dissension among the Justices contributes to the
workload problem not only by spawning separate opinions but also by
inspiring prospective litigants to seek to catapult concurring or dis-
senting views into majority opinions.
B. History of Reform
Concern over the Court's workload is as old as the Court itself. Soon
after the Judiciary Act of 178921 established a six-Justice Supreme
Court, thirteen single-judge district courts, and three circuit courts,
consisting of one district judge and two Supreme Court Justices "rid-
ing circuit," 22 it became apparent that the Court's workload was
constitute a larger percentage of total opinions than in the Court's earlier years. See
Appendix, Chart I.
18. See Appendix, Chart I. Betweeen 1948 and 1970, "the court wrote an aver-
age of 218 opinions annually; after 1970 it averaged 354. There was not a huge
change, however, in the number of 'opinions of the court': they rose from 107
annually to 145. The real rise was in dissents (from 78 to 134) and in separate
concurrences (from 33 to 76)." Barone, Our Overworked Justices Should Fire Some
Law Clerks, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1982, at A17, col. 1.
19. See Appendix, Chart I.
20. See Appendix, Charts II and III. The number of opinions issued during the
1953 Term, however, represented "the smallest number of cases decided on the
merits in ... fourteen years." The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96,
187 (1954). The number of opinions rose in later years to 200 in 1958, 218 in 1963,
267 in 1968, 339 in 1973, 353 in 1977, and 361 in 1982. See Appendix, Charts II and
III.
Whether relevant or not, the increase in the number of separate opinions corre-
sponds to the increase in the number of law clerks. Years ago, some Justices hired one
clerk; by the 1950's, most Justices hired two; by 1970, the Justices were allowed
three; and in 1978, most had four law clerks. Barone, supra note 18, at A17, col. 1;
see Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, 9 Litigation 20, 61 (Spring 1983) ("With rising
case loads, pressure to expand judges' staffs will grow. For any bureaucratic diffi-
culty, bureaucrats prescribe more bureaucracy. But law clerks are not part of the
solution; they are part of the problem.").
21. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
22. Id. at 73-75. The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was limited by this
Act to two types of cases: (1) appeals from circuit court decisions in civil cases
involving sums of more than $2,000; and (2) appeals from final state court rulings
upholding a state law against a challenge that it conflicted with the Constitution,
federal laws or federal treaties. Congressional Quarterly, Guide to the U.S. Supreme
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overwhelming. Congress directed President Washington's Attorney
General, Edmund Randolph, to devise a solution. Recognizing that
the quality of judicial contemplation was essential to the performance
of the Court's function, Randolph reported in 1790: "Sum up all the
fragments of their time, hold their fatigue at naught, and let them bid
adieu to all domestic concerns, still the average term of a life, already
advanced, will be too short for any important proficiency. 2 3
Congress' response in subsequent years was to eliminate the circuit-
riding duties and increase the size of the Supreme Court. 24 In 1891,
Congress established nine circuit courts of appeals and did away with
the mandatory right of appeal in some subject areas by introducing
the concept of discretionary review by writ of certiorari.25 Mandatory
review was retained in only clearly defined areas.26 Nevertheless, by
the 1923 Term the Supreme Court was more than one year behind in
its docket.2 7 This delay was intolerable to Chief Justice Taft, who
Court 263 (1979). The Supreme Court was not granted appellate jurisdiction in
capital criminal cases until 1889. Act of February 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655, 656.
Shortly thereafter the Court's jurisdiction was extended to "infamous crime[s]."
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827; see P. Bator, P.
Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 32-49 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]; F.
Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 109 (1927).
23. F. Frankfurter and J. Landis, supra note 22, at 15 (quoting Rep. Atty. Gen.
1).
24. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This Act broadened the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction "almost to the full extent of the constitutional authorization."
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 22, at 39. Although Congress had, in the meantime,
reduced the Justices' circuit-riding duties and raised the number of Justices from six
to nine, the 1875 Act dramatically increased the number of cases entering the Court's
docket. See Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 5.
25. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. This Act
constituted the first major restructuring of the federal judicial system. It granted the
circuit courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from district courts in virtually all
diversity, admiralty, patent, revenue, and non-capital criminal cases. Supreme
Court review of circuit court decisions was made mandatory only upon the appellate
court's certification of a case to the high court. The Supreme Court also retained
discretionary review of courts of appeals decisions by writ of certiorari. Direct appeal
to the Supreme Court was reserved by the Act only for cases involving constitutional
questions, matters of treaty law, jurisdictional questions, capital crimes, and con-
flicting laws. See Congressional Quarterly, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court 265
(1979).
26. See supra note 24.
27. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United
States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 836 & n.7
(1927). Congress had never, in the past, taken steps to relieve the Court of its
workload until there was evidence of a backlog. There was a backlog of a few years
prior to the 1891 Act, which established the circuit courts of appeals. Alsup, supra
note 9, at 1324-25; see Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59
A.B.A.J. 253, 254 (1973).
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sponsored a committee of Justices to draft legislative reforms. 28 With
uncharacteristic speed, and without the modern congressional ten-
dency to engage in "elegant variation," Congress adopted the Justices'
draft in the Judges' Bill of 1925.2 The bill further narrowed the
mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to a few categories,
including appeals from federal court decisions holding state statutes
unconstitutional or invalid under federal law or treaties, and state
court decisions upholding state statutes against federal constitutional
attack.30 The framework established by the Judges' Bill of 1925 per-
sists today, giving the Supreme Court great flexibility in choosing its
cases for review. For, instead of narrowing the Court's jurisdiction,
Congress chose, in more and more instances, to delegate to the Court
the responsibility for determining which federal issues are of sufficient
national importance to warrant Supreme Court review.3 1 The process
of issue selection, therefore, has become an increasingly crucial part of
the review function. While Congress, in 1976, eliminated the right of
direct appeal from three-judge district courts in most cases, 32 there
have not been any significant statutory changes in the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction since 1925.33
28. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra note 22, at 259-60; see Blumstein, The
Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ
Dismissals, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 895, 898-99 (1973).
29. Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
30. Id. at 937, 939. Direct appeals to the Supreme Court remained available,
inter alia, in cases under antitrust or interstate commerce laws; appeals by the
federal government under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907; suits to halt enforce-
ment of state laws or official state actions; and suits to halt Interstate Commerce
Commission orders. In the 1970's most of the direct appeal jurisdiction was elimi-
nated, except for appeals from a federal district court holding a federal statute
unconstitutional, 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976), and appeals from a decision of a panel of
three district judges, convened pursuant to an act of Congress or in reapportionment
cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1976). Congressional Quarterly, Guide to the U.S.
Supreme Court 265 (1979).
31. See Blumstein, supra note 28, at 903. See supra notes 25-30 and accompany-
ing text.
32. Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976) (repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(1976)).
33. President Franklin Roosevelt, of course, tried and failed to increase the
number of Justices in his "court-packing" reorganization plan of 1937, but his mo-
tives were to outnumber the conservative majority. Some scholars believe, however,
that the mere threat had an effect on the decision-making process. L. Baker, Felix
Frankfurter 187-91 (1969); see M. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times 272
(1982). In addition, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,'.Pub. L. No. 97-
164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 37, (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West Supp.
1983)), transferred the duties of the Court of Claims and Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals to the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, thereby elimi-
nating Supreme Court review of appeals from the previously existing courts. Al-
though decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are reviewable under
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The rising case load, nevertheless, has continued to stimulate dis-
cussion. 4 In 1971, the Chief Justice appointed a seven-member study
committee, chaired by Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law
School. The Freund Committee recommended the establishment of a
National Court of Appeals to screen all certiorari petitions and ap-
peals, referring approximately 400 to the Supreme Court and denying
the rest.35 Of the cases referred to it, the Supreme Court would decide
either to grant or deny certiorari, or to remand the case to the Na-
tional Court of Appeals for decision.3 6 If the National Court of Ap-
peals did not refer a case to the Supreme Court, there would be no
procedure by which the Court could review such a decision. Thus,
had this proposal been adopted, many issues would never have come
to the attention of the Supreme Court in any form, and the choice of
factual context in which the issues presented to the Court are reviewed
would have been severely restricted.
In 1972, Congress established a commission headed by Roman
Hruska. This commission also recommended the establishment of a
National Court of Appeals.37 This proposed National Court, however,
would not have screened certiorari petitions, but rather would have
heard cases referred to it by the Supreme Court or transferred to it by
a court of appeals.3 8 The Supreme Court would thus have been forced
to expend its time reviewing which cases should go to the National
Court of Appeals. The Freund and Hruska proposals generated a
flurry of scholarly comment, both favorable and unfavorable.3 9 Some
the same statute which governs Supreme Court review of other court of appeals
decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976), the Act's legislative history suggests that the
creation of the new court was inspired at least in part by a desire to relieve the
Supreme Court of some of its burdensome workload. See S. Rep. No. 275, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 11, 13.
34. For a thoughtful analysis of the Supreme Court's caseload see G. Casper & R.
Posner, The Workload of the Supreme Court (1976); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis,
supra note 22; Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 Cornell L. Q. 401
(1960). For a delightful essay on the workload issue, see Kurland & Hutchinson, The
Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 628 (1983).
35. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the
Supreme Court 47 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Study Group]. See
Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 Hastings L.J. 1301, 1305-09 (1974).
36. Report of the Study Group, supra note 35, at 47. The Freund committee also
recommended the substitution of certiorari for the Court's mandatory appellate
jurisdiction, the elimination of the three-judge district courts (which has been accom-
plished for the most part, see supra note 32), and the establishment of a non-judicial
panel to investigate and report on prisoner complaints. Id. at 47-48.
37. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure
and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change 5, 30 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Recommendations for Change].
38. Id. at 32.
39. See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Caseload of the Supreme Court and What, If
Anything to do About It (1973); Black, The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise
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critics thought the proposals would be an unconstitutional delegation
of authority vested in "one supreme Court"40 and, more importantly,
would deprive the Court of essential functions and information in the
selection and resolution of fundamental national issues.41
The most recent proposal-currently on the congressional
agenda 42-was made by the Chief Justice at the American Bar Associ-
ation meeting in New Orleans in February of 1983. The Chief Justice
advocates, as an interim step, the establishment of a five-year tempo-
rary special panel of the new United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. The special panel would have the narrow jurisdiction
to decide all inter-circuit conflicts. 43 Two judges would be designated
from each circuit, creating a pool of twenty-six judges. A panel of
seven to nine judges would be drawn from the pool for six months to a
year to hear and decide all inter-circuit conflicts and, possibly, a
defined category of statutory interpretation cases. The panel could
remove 35 to 50 cases a year from the argument calendar of the
Supreme Court, which would, however, retain certiorari jurisdiction
over these cases. 44 The Chief Justice views his proposal as only an
interim and partial solution and, therefore, further consideration of a
permanent National Court of Appeals is not entirely moot.
In addition to proposals for reform, the Supreme Court has at-
tempted to alleviate its workload over the last two decades through
Proposal, 83 Yale L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan II, supra note 9; Freund, Why We Need
a National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973); Gressman, supra note 27;
Warren & Burger, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger De-
fends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973);
Composition, Constitutionality, and Desirability, supra note 9.
40. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
41. Black, supra note 39, at 885-87; Warren, supra note 39, at 729; Composition,
Constitutionality, and Desirability, supra note 9, at 873-85.
42. Five bills, S. 381 through S. 385, were introduced by Senator Heflin on
February 2, 1983, covering such subjects as the establishment of a National Court of
Appeals, provision for mandatory Supreme Court review in certain areas, and crea-
tion of a Federal Courts Study Commission. 129 Cong. Rec. S892-94 (daily ed. Feb.
2, 1983). These bills were consolidated, amended slightly, and reintroduced as a
single bill, S. 645, on March 1, 1983. 129 Cong. Rec. S1845 (daily ed. March 1,
1983). Senator Dole was the primary sponsor of the new bill. The Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Rights and Administration of Justice reported favorably on S. 645 on
June 29, 1983. 1983-1984 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,013. Two portions of the Senate
legislation-the National Court of Appeals ("Intercircuit Tribunal") and mandatory
jurisdiction provisions-were separately introduced in the House by Congressman
Kastenmeier on March 8, 1983. 129 Cong. Rec. H940 (daily ed. March 8, 1983). The
two bills, H.R. 1968 and H.R. 1970, were considered at hearings held by the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice on April
27, 1983. 1983-1984 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,015.
43. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 447.
44. Id.
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self-help measures. These include shortening the time for oral argu-
ment to half an hour; assigning additional law clerks to the Justices;
dispensing with records on petitions for certiorari; and, in some cases,
pooling law clerk resources. 45 Despite these efforts, the workload
problem persists.
In recent months, most of the Associate Justices have begun to speak
out on the workload problem, offering a variety of solutions on the
following subjects:
Mandatory Jurisdiction. All the Justices who have spoken publicly
agree that the remaining mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court should be eliminated. 46
Screening Certiorari Petitions. Justice Stevens has recommended
that the function of screening certiorari petitions be delegated to a
new National Court of Appeals. 47 If a new National Court of Appeals
is not created, however, Justice Stevens has suggested that five instead
of four votes be required in order to grant certiorari.48
Inter-circuit Conflicts. Justice White has suggested that a federal
court of appeals be required to hold a hearing en bane before it takes a
position on the interpretation of a statute that differs from that of
another court of appeals. 4 The first en bane decision would be bind-
ing on all the other circuits and reviewable only by the Supreme
Court.50 Justice Stevens has recommended that Congress establish a
standing committee to decide between two conflicting judicial read-
ings of a given statute.5 1 The committee would propose a statutory
revision to resolve the conflict.52 Justice Brennan has taken issue with
Justice Stevens' suggestion because "it overlooks the role of compro-
mise in the legislative process. '53 As previously noted, Chief Justice
Burger recommends that inter-circuit conflicts be resolved by a special
temporary panel of the new United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. 54
45. Freund, supra note 35, at 1304.
46. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 235; Powell, supra note 7, at 1371; Stevens, The
Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule; 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Stevens I]; Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Judicial Conference of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, 93 F.R.D. 153, 162 (1981) (remarks of Chief Justice
Burger) [hereinafter cited as Remarks of Chief Justice Burger]; Comments of Justice
O'Connor, supra note 7, at 12.
47. Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 182 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Stevens II].
48. Stevens I, supra note 46, at 21.
49. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 232 (quoting Justice White).
50. Id.
51. Stevens II, supra note 47, at 183.
52. Id.
53. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 233.
54. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 4.
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Limitations on Jurisdiction. Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Con-
nor have suggested a number of limitations on federal courts' diver-
sity, habeas corpus, and Section 1983 jurisdiction 55 that would reduce
the flow of cases to the Supreme Court.56 Justice Powell has noted that
the number of civil rights actions filed in federal courts has increased
from approximately 270 to 30,000 over the last twenty years. 57
Approximately half of the over 30,000 civil rights suits filed in 1981
were filed by state prisoners under Section 1983.58 Justice Powell,
therefore, would limit the habeas review to "cases of manifest injus-
tice in which the issue is guilt or innocence." 59
Greater Selectivity. Other Justices have advocated greater selectiv-
ity on the part of the Supreme Court in deciding what cases to take.
Justices Stevens and Brennan, among others, would minimize the
Supreme Court's role in correcting lower court errors and in the
review of cases at an interlocutory stage. 60
Reforms recommended by the Justices and others fall into three
general categories: delegation of Supreme Court authority to another
court to select or decide cases, '6 1 further statutory limitations on the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or on federal courts in general, 62
and the exercise of greater judicial restraint and discipline by the
Supreme Court itself in its selection of issues for review.6 3 All three
55. See Powell, supra note 7, at 1372 ("[T]hese three sources of federal court
jurisdiction provided nearly 40 per cent of the total district court civil filings.").
56. Justices Powell and O'Connor would require exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to bringing a Section 1983 lawsuit and recommend study of possible
elimination or limitation of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Comments
of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 14; Powell, supra note 7, at 1371-72. Justice
Powell would modify further the habeas corpus jurisdiction of federal courts, see 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), to create finality of federal review or a statute of limitations,
and would make the court of appeals' jurisdiction over certain categories of cases (for
example, administrative agency actions) discretionary. Powell, supra note 7, at 1371-
72. Justice Rehnquist would have Congress review statutes that create a federal cause
of action to determine whether access to the federal courts through these statutes
should be limited or eliminated. See Remarks of Justice Rehnquist, supra note 10, at
30.
57. Powell, supra note 46, at 1371.
58. Id. According to Justice Powell, "no other system of justice [is] structured in a
way that assures no end to the litigation of a criminal conviction" the way our system
does through unnecessarily repeated use of the federal habeas statute. Id.
59. Id. at 1372.
60. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 231; Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180.
61. See Annual Report, supra note 1, at 447; Stevens II, supra note 47, at 182;
Recommendations for Change, supra note 37, at 30-39; Report of the Study Group,
supra note 35, at 47.
62. See Powell, supra note 7, at 1371-72; Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra
note 7, at 14; Remarks of Justice Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 30.
63. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 231; Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180. Several
Justices also have suggested procedural changes to expedite the resolution of some
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approaches merit serious study and debate. Emphasis, however,
should be placed on the third, with the addition of a fourth that will
be advanced with great temerity at the end of this Article. 4 The
preferred approaches would concentrate on the fulfillment of the
Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to construct a legal consensus
on a few issues of fundamental national significance.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Proposals for an Intermediary Court
Delegation of the Supreme Court's case selection authority to an
intermediary supercourt of appeals seems contrary to the Constitu-
tion's provision for "one supreme Court."6 5 Constitutional consider-
ations apart, however, delegation of the Supreme Court's power to
screen cases would significantly alter the function of the Supreme
Court in shaping constitutional law. The power to select cases is a
fundamental part of the power to define the issues and trends in the
development of constitutional and statutory interpretation. 66
Life-tenured Supreme Court Justices bring to the issue-selection
process a variety of backgrounds-judicial, political, and aca-
demic 6 7 -an experienced ear attuned to monitoring the heartbeat of a
living Constitution, and a reasoned interaction of diverse philosophies
and interests.68 Because most Justices are assimilated gradually during
extended intervals, the Court provides continuity, knowledge of
trends, and collective perspective that simply could not be replicated
in a panel of rotating judges with more limited functions and pur-
cases. Chief Justice Burger has proposed establishing a grievance procedure in the
prison system to reduce the need for prisoners' litigation. Remarks of Chief Justice
Burger, supra note 46, at 165. Justice O'Connor advocates the institutionalization of
alternative forms of dispute resolution outside the court system. Comments of Justice
O'Connor, supra note 7, at 14. Although opposed to the proposition, Justice Brennan
has mentioned that "there is sentiment among some of [his] colleagues" to reduce or
eliminate oral argument in certain Supreme Court cases. Brennan I, supra note 7, at
232.
64. See infra pt. II(B)(4).
65. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see Black, supra note 39, at 885-87.
66. See Black, supra note 39, at 891 (quoting Hoadly's sermon preached before
the King, March 31, 1717) ("Whoever hath an absolute authority to control the
nature and scope of questions to be decided is to all intents and purposes controller
over the process of decision."); Blumstein, supra note 28, at 907.
67. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
68. Justice Brennan once commented: "I expect that only a Justice of the Court
can know how inseparably intertwined are all the Court's functions, and how
arduous and long is the process of developing the sensitivity to constitutional adjudi-
cation that marks the role." Brennan II, supra note 9, at 484.
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poses.69 In selecting cases for review, Justices must weigh not only the
importance of the issues presented, but the timeliness of their review,
the appropriateness of the factual context in which they arise, the
adequacy of representation by counsel, the likely views of the other
Justices on the merits, the reasons why on previous occasions they may
have avoided the issues, and the relationship of the issues presented to
issues in other pending cases and doctrinal developments.70
As Justice Brennan has stated:
In my experience over more than a quarter century, the screening
process has been, and is today, inextricably linked to the fulfillment
... of the Court's unique mission....
The choice of issues for decision largely determines the image
that the American people have of their Supreme Court. The
Court's calendar mirrors the everchanging concerns of this society
with ever more powerful and smothering government. The calen-
dar is therefore the indispensable source for keeping the Court
abreast of these concerns. Our Constitution is a living document
and the Court often becomes aware of the necessity for reconsidera-
tion of its interpretation only because filed cases reveal the need for
new and previously unanticipated applications of constitutional
principles .... [T]o limit the Court's consideration to a mere
handful of the cases selected by others would obviously result in
isolating the Court from many nuances and trends of legal change
throughout the land.
The point is that the evolution of constitutional doctrine is not
merely a matter of hearing arguments and writing opinions in cases
granted review .... The screening function is an indispensible and
inseparable part of the entire process and it cannot be withdrawn
from the Court without grave risk of impairing the very core of the
Court's unique and extraordinary functions. 7'
The selection of the appropriate time and factual context in which
to address-or readdress-an issue of constitutional or societal impor-
tance is uniquely a function of the Supreme Court. The decision to
grant the petition for certiorari in Baker v. Car7 2 would not inevita-
69. In fact, throughout the nation's history only 103 Justices have served on the
Supreme Court. Indeed, there are more judges sitting on the circuit courts today-
132-than have served on the Supreme Court since its establishment. See Adminis-
trative Office Report, supra note 10, at 77.
70. Justice Frankfurter often remarked that his personal reading of the petitions
for certiorari and jurisdictional statements was the most important judicial function
he performed. See L. Baker, supra note 33, at 215 (1969). This fortunately relieved
his law clerks from having to write thirty or more bench memos each week on
certiorari petitions and jurisdictional statements.
71. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 235.
72. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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bly have been the choice of an intermediary supercourt of appeals,
given the Supreme Court's clear direction in Colegrove v. Green73 that
legislative apportionment was a political matter beyond the province
of the Court.74 Nor is it clear whether an intermediary supercourt of
appeals would have considered the question of school desegregation in
Brown v. Board of Education75 worthy of the Supreme Court's atten-
tion, or whether the doctrine of "separate but equal" in Plessy v.
Ferguson76 would have resolved the matter conclusively. Moreover,
three years after the Court had held in Rummel v. Estelle 7 that the
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment"
could not be invoked to shorten the length of a sentence, it is equally
doubtful that an intermediary court would have thought the Court
would again be interested in reviewing the sentence issue. In Solem v.
Helm,78 however, the Court held that the eighth amendment pro-
scribes a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a seventh
nonviolent felony. 79
Another example of the dangers presented by separating the screen-
ing process from the decisional process is Gideon v. Wainwright.80
During the 1962 Term, many petitions raising the issue of right to
counsel were presented and rejected"' before the Court seized upon
Gideon as a proper vehicle for carrying out its intention to overrule
Betts v. Brady.82 Under the proposed system, not all of those petitions
would have been presented to the Court and, as a result, the Court's
"menu of vehicles" for reviewing the issue would have been limited,
making it less likely that an appropriate case would have been
found.8 3 Had the Supreme Court been denied access to these and other
cases, the shape of constitutional law today would have been drasti-
cally altered. 84
73. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
74. Id. at 552; see Black, supra note 39, at 889-91.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
77. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
78. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
79. Id. at 3013, 3016.
80. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81. See Alsup, supra note 9, at 1334.
82. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
see Alsup, supra note 9, at 1334.
83. Alsup, supra note 9, at 1334.
84. For other cases that might not have been chosen by an intermediary super-
court of appeals because strong precedent existed, consider: Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 102-03 (1968) (taxpayers have standing to challenge spending programs on the
ground that they exceed "specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise
of the congressional taxing and spending power"), in light of Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (absent direct injury, taxpayer lacks standing to challenge
[Vol. 52
SUPREME COURT CASELOAD
Efforts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by statute
or to delegate specific issues for final resolution by an inferior court-
either a permanent new court or a rotating panel of judges-present
additional public policy problems. Lower court judges may not have
the stature or detachment required to address the highly explosive
social and economic issues of which the Supreme Court is the ultimate
arbiter. Justices who reach the pinnacle of the judicial system bring
with them, acquire, or have "thrust upon them" (by virtue of their
unreviewable, life-tenured authority) an aura of detached wisdom.
Such proposals misapprehend the unique function that the Supreme
Court plays in our constitutional democracy. 5 The Supreme Court is
not the final court of errors and appeals. In the words of the Freund
Committee:
The cases which it is the primary duty of the Court to decide are
those that, by hypothesis, present the most fundamental and diffi-
cult issues of law and judgment .... To maintain the constitu-
tional order the Court must decide controversies that have sharply
divided legislators, lawyers, and the public. And in deciding, the
Court must strive to understand and elucidate the complexities of
the issues, to give direction to the law, and to be as precise, persua-
sive, and invulnerable as possible in its exposition.86
The issue is not whether there should be limitations on access to the
Supreme Court; obviously there must be. As the number of cases
Acts of Congress); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) (abstract advo-
cacy of government overthrow not actionable under Smith Act absent incitement to
action), in light of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (advocacy of
future government overthrow actionable under the Smith Act); and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing "actual malice" require-
ment for recovery by a public official in a libel action), in light of Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (libelous statements are not protected by first amendment).
See Black, supra note 39, at 888-90 (1974).
Other cases might well have been judged too trivial for Supreme Court review. It
is hard to imagine that the proposed intermediary court would have referred to the
Supreme Court the "Shuffling Sam" case, Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960), in which a loitering conviction was overturned on due process grounds
for lack of evidentiary support. Similarly, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971),
would almost certainly have been a casualty of an intermediary supercourt of ap-
peals. How many judges on such a court would have found the First Amendment
right to wear a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse conse-
quential enough to merit the Supreme Court's attention? See Alsup, supra note 9, at
1313.
85. As Professor Black aptly remarked, "[t]he authors of [the Report of the Study
Group] are recommending amputation of the right arm as a cure for overweight"
when they suggest that vesting the screening function in another court will cure the
Supreme Court's caseload problem. Black, supra note 39, at 891.
86. Report of the Study Group, supra note 35, at 1.
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increases, the percentage which can be reviewed in the Supreme
Court correspondingly diminishes. The Supreme Court, however,
need not foreclose its power to make important judgments in certain
jurisdictional areas. Rather, it should retain the discretion to choose
the issues worthy of its review in the broadest possible jurisdictional
environment. An inferior court simply cannot bring to significant
national issues the experience of collegial interaction and moral au-
thority necessary to sustain the independence of its actions. Nor should
a national appellate court be established merely to correct the errors
of other appellate courts. If this were its function, the ultimate effect
would be an erosion of respect for the federal appellate courts-courts
which historically have attracted jurists of great distinction. It is one
thing for a great jurist like Learned Hand to be overruled by the
Supreme Court; it would be quite a different matter for him to be
overruled by a rotating panel of judges. The primary responsibility for
correcting errors should rest with the circuit courts. A solution to the
Supreme Court's workload problem is needed, however, which both
preserves and enhances the ability of the Court to perform its core
constitutional responsibilities.
B. An Alternative Proposal
The Supreme Court must be freed from the illusion that it has a
duty to correct every error and resolve every conflict. At the same
time, the Court needs to identify and resolve legal issues of fundamen-
tal national significance in a clear and consistent manner. The pro-
posal outlined below achieves these goals and consists of four interre-
lated parts.
(1) The Supreme Court's remaining mandatory appellate jurisdic-
tion should be limited to constitutional cases in which fundamental
human rights raising an issue of nationwide divisiveness are in-
volved.8 7 The Court should be the guardian of its docket and not be
forced by statute to take for argument and decision any case which it
otherwise would determine is not of prime national importance.
(2) Conflicts among the circuit courts that do not involve issues
worthy of Supreme Court review should be resolved by the affected
circuits without any involvement of the Court.
(3) The Supreme Court should be highly selective in choosing for
review only issues of fundamental national significance.
87. Rather than completely eliminating mandatory jurisdiction, it is preferable
to limit it to narrower circumstances. See American Law Division (Congressional
Research Service), Report on Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States 62 (Preliminary Draft June 18, 1982) (available in files of
Fordham Law Review).
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(4) The Supreme Court should reduce the pressure on its caseload
by discouraging unnecessary litigation (and invitations to unfocused
arguments on the part of the bar) through the exercise of greater
judicial restraint, collegial deference, and disciplined opinion writing
by the Justices.
The first and second parts of the proposal are intended to reduce the
flow of cases that the Supreme Court now feels obligated to review
even though they do not involve issues of prime national importance.
1. Reducing the Number of Cases Presented for Review
It has been estimated that mandatory appeals constitute about 25
percent of the Court's caseload. 8 Enactment of H.R. 196889 and S.
6450 would replace the Court's remaining mandatory appellate juris-
diction with discretionary review, thus reducing the number of cases
the Court must review each year. Elimination of mandatory jurisdic-
tion, except in truly rare situations, is necessary9' to complete the
conversion of the Supreme Court-started by the Act of 189192 and
accelerated by the Judges' Bill of 1925 93-from a final court of errors
and appeals to the ultimate judicial authority on issues of fundamen-
tal national significance. The one exception to the total elimination of
mandatory jurisdiction, necessary to preserve the core constitutional
responsibility of the Court, would be to mandate review of those cases
in which a lower court has upheld the constitutionality of a state or
federal statute denying fundamental human rights of a truly divisive
national character. Because the Supreme Court is the ultimate vindi-
cator of such rights under the Constitution, it would not be consistent
with the Court's constitutional responsibility to avoid such issues
through the discretionary denial of review. History teaches that the
ability to avoid an issue may be too facile a solution to a politically
uncomfortable situation-a solution too readily available and too
often seized by the legislative and executive branches of government.
Mandatory judicial review has forced some of the great civil rights
gains of the past. 4
88. Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 12. For an even higher
estimate of cases arising out of mandatory appeals see H.R. Rep. No. 824, pt. I, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92 app. B. (1982) (36.2%).
89. H.R. 1968, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
90. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
91. The Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice received a letter from all nine Supreme Court Justices recommending that
H.R. 6872, a bill curtailing the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, be adopted. H.R. Rep. No. 824, pt. I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
92. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
93. Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
94. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
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2. Alternatives for Resolving Inter-Circuit Conflicts
The second part of the proposal also reduces the number of cases
that require Supreme Court review. It simply is not necessary, in the
fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities, for the Supreme Court
to act as an arbitrator among conflicting circuit courts unless the issues
are of fundamental national significance. Justice O'Connor has esti-
mated that 23.7 percent of the Supreme Court's decided cases during
her first term involved "interpretation[s] of statutes on which the
lower courts had reached conflicting decisions." 95 Professor Schaefer
has concluded that there are more than a hundred conflicting statu-
tory interpretations among circuit court decisions each year. 96 In a
recent Term, of the 149 cases in which the Supreme Court granted
plenary review, 26 involved conflicts among the circuits on the issue
presented.97 There is a growing consensus that another mechanism is
needed to resolve these conflicts. Suggested mechanisms range from
the Chief Justice's proposal for a temporary national panel98 to Justice
White's proposal for a mandatory en bane hearing.99
The approach suggested in this Article is a variation on these pro-
posals, which is designed to augment the underlying theme of these
reforms: the resolution of legal conflict through collegial reason and
the search for consensus. Whenever a circuit renders a decision that is
in conflict with a prior decision of another circuit, the losing party
should be allowed to petition the court issuing the conflicting opinion
for a rehearing before a panel of seven judges, three from each of the
two circuits which gave rise to the conflict, and a seventh to be
assigned from another circuit by the Chief Justice. 10 Judges from the
two circuits in conflict thus would participate in an en bane rehearing
to resolve the conflict. 101 The decision of the en bane panel would
constitute binding precedent on all circuits, subject only to discretion-
ary review by the Supreme Court if an issue of fundamental national
importance is presented. Should a third circuit fail to follow the
95. Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 13.
96. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A.J. 452, 454 (1983).
97. Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed
for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 913, 938 (1983).
98. See Annual Report, supra note 1, at 447.
99. See Brennan I, supra note 7, at 232 (quoting Justice White). It has also been
suggested that the number of inter-circuit conflicts could be reduced by reducing the
number of circuits. Wallace, supra note 97, at 940.
100. The Chief Justice is authorized to "assign temporarily any circuit judge to act
as circuit judge in another circuit." 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1976).
101. Circuit judges are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976) to sit en bane
within a single circuit, but the statute makes no reference to inter-circuit en bane
hearings. Hence, legislation would be required to effect this portion of the proposal.
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precedent established by the inter-circuit en banc hearing, 10 2 the peti-
tioner could request an en banc hearing by seven judges, two from
each of the three circuits that had addressed the issue and one assigned
by the Chief Justice. While this approach would require legislation,10 3
it is preferred to the alternatives that have been proposed because:
(1) it avoids the creation of a new court or the enlargement of the
new Federal Circuit Court by a special panel of twenty-six judges;
(2) it promotes judicial efficiency and consistency because the issue
has already been briefed and argued before at least three of the judges
conducting the rehearing;
(3) it forces the judges who disagree with their peers to confront,
discuss and, it is hoped, resolve their differences;
(4) it does not elevate a group of circuit court judges to a special
panel to sit in judgment on their peers;
(5) it avoids involving the Supreme Court except for the Chief
Justice's strictly administrative task of designating one of the circuit
judges; and
(6) it does not create the public impression of a "supercourt,"
without the attributes of the Supreme Court, that would undermine
public respect for the circuit courts.
The long-term effect of bringing the differing circuit judges to-
gether would be a greater respect on the part of federal appellate
judges for the precedents of other circuits. Indeed, such respect should
be encouraged by the Supreme Court through its rules and decisions.
There are no inherent geographic or political reasons why federal
judges in the thirteen circuits should apply federal statutes differently
in response to local circumstances. 10 4 The argument that circuit con-
flicts help sharpen the issues for Supreme Court review or provide a
testing ground for various interpretations is, in a word, foolish. In any
event, such an argument is far outweighed by the injustice, chaos, and
burden of litigation caused by conflicting statutory interpretations.
The words of Eighth Circuit Judge Lay in Aldens Inc. v. Miller'0 5 are
instructive:
As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law
among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus
avoiding unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court docket. Unless
102. The decision of the inter-circuit en banc court would be binding precedent
for all other circuits. It is therefore hoped that the need for the further procedure set
forth above would be rare indeed.
103. While "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business" under the
authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976), nowhere are they given express authority to
hold inter-circuit en banc hearings. The Court cannot alter its own jurisdiction.
104. See Schaefer, supra note 96, at 454.
105. 610 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
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our ...courts of appeals are thus willing to promote a cohesive
network of national law, needless division and confusion will en-
courage further splintering and the formation of otherwise unnec-
essary additional tiers in the framework of our national court sys-
tem.10 6
These two proposals-if the earlier cited estimates of conflict and
mandatory jurisdiction cases are correct-could reduce the number of
cases argued before the Court by up to 47 percent.10 7
3. Concentrating Supreme Court Decision-Making
The third suggestion is, in large measure, an acknowledgment of
what has become a reality. Since Congress enacted the Judges Bill of
1925,108 the Supreme Court has not been expected to take on the
"function .. .of primarily-or even largely-correcting errors com-
mitted by other courts."'" 0 The value of Supreme Court decision-
making is not in how many individual disputes are resolved, but
rather in the clarity and cohesiveness of the legal guidance it provides
the highest courts of the various states, the lower federal and state
courts and the political branches of government.
As Congress reacts to media events and special interest pleas, and as
the executive branch is consumed by "crisis-coping" and "fire-fight-
ing," the importance of a third and independent branch, committed
to reflective reasoning and to a rational search for sometimes elusive
constitutional values increases. As Justice Holmes once said:
The best defense for leaving fundamental responsibilities to this
Court came from Brandeis ... that constitutional restrictions en-
able a man to sleep at night and know that he won't be robbed
before morning-which, in days of legislative activity and general
scheming, otherwise, he scarcely would feel sure about." 0
Individuals selected to fulfill this constitutional mandate need not
necessarily be judges by experience, although Justices Holmes and
Stewart, among others, demonstrated that appointments from the
judiciary often function superbly. Some of the greatest Justices-to
106. Id. at 541.
107. See supra notes 88, 95 and accompanying text (25 % of the caseload are cases
arising out of mandatory jurisdiction and 23.7 % involve inter-circuit conflicts).
108. Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
109. Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180. "It is far better to allow the state supreme
courts and federal courts of appeals to have the final say on almost all litigation than
to embark on the hopeless task of attempting to correct every judicial error that can
be found." Id.
110. Letter from O.W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter, Holmes Papers, Harvard
Law School (April 20, 1921) (quoted in A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea
of Progress 28 (1970)) [hereinafter cited as A. Bickel I].
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speak only of those no longer on the bench-have come from aca-
demic halls (Frankfurter), from the practicing bar (Brandeis and
Harlan), and from the political process (John Marshall, Warren and
Black)."' Justice Frankfurter once wrote that a Justice must have
"poetic sensibilities" and the "gift of imagination.""12 He must "pierce
the curtain of the future ... and give shape and visage to mysteries
still in the womb of time.""13 To enable each Justice to contribute a
unique perspective and reasoned insight requires "ample time," again
in the words of Justice Frankfurter, "and freshness of mind for private
study and reflection in preparation for discussion at Conference."1 4
As Professor Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School wrote,
"[t]he logic of constitutional law is the common sense of the Supreme
Court of the United States."" 5
No Plimsoll line can be established which helps the Court to dis-
charge its difficult responsibilities. With many of the issues with
which it deals-for example, due process, just compensation, equal
protection-the Court is left with the need for intuitive judgment.
According to Justice Powell, however, simply coping with the rising
caseload may require a Justice during the busy opinion writing
months of May and June to work "twelve to fifteen hours a day, six
days [a] week."" 6 Such a schedule simply is not conducive to quiet
reflection or sound judgment." 7 The answer is not to relegate the
Justices, like too many senators and cabinet officers, to the role of
managers of an ever-expanding staff.8 Rather, the Court should limit
the number of cases that it decides on the merits each year to a
manageable number, allowing sufficient time for discussion, common
111. Prior to his service on the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter was a professor
at the Harvard Law School. Congressional Quarterly, Guide to the Supreme Court
851. Justices Brandeis and Harlan were in private practice. Id. at 842-43, 859. Justice
John Marshall served in the Virginia House of Delegates, as minister to France, and
as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Id. at 804. Chief Justice Warren
served both as attorney general and governor of California. Id. at 858. Justice Black
was a member of the U.S. Senate. Id. at 849.
112. F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 39 (1956) (quoted in A. Bickel I, supra note
110, at 38).
113. Id.
114. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co, 359 U.S. 437, 458 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
115. Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. Phil. Psychol-
ogy & Sci. Method 645, 646 (1918) (quoted in A. Bickel I, supra note 110, at 20).
116. Powell, supra note 7, at 1372.
117. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forward: The Time Chart of the
justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99-100 (1959).
118. Justice Brandeis once observed: "The reason the public thinks so much of the
Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington
who do their own work." C. Wyzanski, Whereas-A Judge's Premises 61 (1965)
(remark of Justice Brandeis) (quoted in Remarks of Justice Rehnquist, supra, note 10,
at 27).
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sense reflection and clarity of presentation. As Justice Stevens has
noted, the Supreme Court's caseload could be reduced significantly by
stricter adherence to the doctrine of judicial restraint.'1 9 Very simply,
if it is not necessary to decide the issue-if the issue is not ripe for
review-the Court should not undertake to decide it, for as Alexander
Bickel said, "[n]o answer is what the wrong question begets.' °2 0 There
are, moreover, some issues that the Court simply need not address. In
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. ,121 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide the validity of respondent's patent covering a water flush sys-
tem to remove cow manure from the floor of a dairy barn. The
Court's holding that the system "did not produce a 'new or different
function' . . . within the test of validity of combination patents"'22
was certainly helpful to the litigants involved but hardly an issue of
prime national importance.
Justices Brennan and Stevens have publicly cited the school library
case, Board of Education v. Pico, 2 3 as an example of the type of case
the the Supreme Court should not take. 24 The issue there was
whether the first amendment restrained the school board in the re-
moval of books from a school library. 25 After the district judge
granted the school board summary judgment, 26 the Second Circuit
reversed on the ground that the case presented a genuine issue of fact
as to the school board's motivation. 2 7 Further proceedings by the trial
court would have clarified the constitutional issue and perhaps
mooted the entire case. 128 Yet the Supreme Court took the case at the
interlocutory stage, disposed of it by affirming the remand for trial
and filed seven separate opinions, none of which commanded the
votes of a majority. The Supreme Court addressed a constitutional
issue prematurely, and in such a confusing and ambiguous manner
that it undoubtedly will stimulate a great deal of litigation in search of
a clearer set of guiding principles. As Justice Marshall, one of only two
Justices who did not write a separate opinion in Pico, commented, "it
may be pretty difficult for the lower courts, or anyone else, to figure
119. Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180; see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
120. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 103 (1962).
121. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
122. Id. at 282 (quoting Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396
U.S. 57, 60 (1969)).
123. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
124. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 231; Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180.
125. 457 U.S. at 855-56.
126. See id. at 859.
127. Id. at 860-61.
128. Brennan I, supra note 7, at 232.
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out exactly what the decision stands for.' 29 Perhaps when the Court
took the case for review it thought that a consensus could be achieved,
but after briefing and argument that consensus proved impossible.
The Court then should have considered a summary remand.
Another type of case that the Supreme Court need not review
involves issues limited to a specific geographical area. In Watt v.
Alaska,'30 for example, the Supreme Court reviewed a dispute be-
tween Alaska and one of its counties over the division of mineral
leasing revenues' 3 1-a dispute that could only arise in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. While there may have been an error by the court below, this was
not a sufficient reason for Supreme Court review of a decision that did
not have any implications beyond Alaska.
Cases which are factually unique also need not be reviewed. In
Oregon v. Kennedy,' 32 for example, five Justices volunteered a new
double jeopardy doctrine' 33 even though the Oregon Court of Appeals
had misapplied the doctrine to a peculiar set of facts unlikely to be
duplicated elsewhere.13 4 The Supreme Court's pronouncement was
totally unnecessary to the resolution of the specific case. Moreover, the
Oregon court was free to reinstate its prior judgment by relying on
Oregon rather than federal law.'35
129. Remarks of Justice Marshall, Second Circuit Judicial Conference, at 2 (Sept.
9, 1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
130. 451 U.S. 259 (1981).
131. Id. at 263.
132. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
133. Id. at 679.
134. Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180.
135. Id. Another example of the Court's lack of judicial restraint may be found in
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). There the court below had
held that Snepp's publication of a book about Viet Nam had violated his secrecy
agreement with the CIA. Id. at 508. The government opposed Snepp's petition for
certiorari and filed a conditional cross-petition, praying that if the Court granted
Snepp's petition it also should consider whether the remedy ordered by the lower
court was adequate. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court granted
both petitions, but summarily dismissed Snepp's claim, id., and without hearing
argument on the merits, issued a per curiam opinion ordering that a constructive
trust be imposed on the book's earnings even though there was neither a statutory nor
a contractual basis for this novel remedy. Id. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since
the government had not even asked the Court to review the remedy issue unless it
granted Snepp's petition, this was a clear example of the Court's unnecessary exercise
of power. Stevens II, supra note 47, at 181. Another example is Michigan v. Long,
103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), in which the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a
decision by the Michigan Supreme Court because the lower court had given too.
restrictive an interpretation to federal constitutional law. Id. at 3478-82. The Court,
notwithstanding similar provisions in the Michigan Constitution, held that absent
clear evidence in the lower court opinion of adequate state law grounds, the Court
will presume that the decision is based on federal law. Id. at 3476. Justice Stevens
dissented, not only because of the Court's adoption of "presumptive jurisdiction" but
because the Court should not be concerned with a state court decision which provides
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These cases clearly illustrate the need for more disciplined case
selection and opinion writing. Each decision of the Supreme Court
should be a uniquely crafted work of art; even the dissenting views,
like contrasting colors and off-setting shadows, should contribute to
the clarity and vitality of the whole. It is hoped the Court's archetypes
would tend more toward the harmony of Monet and clarity of Rem-
brandt than the harried spontaneity of Pollock or discordance of
Kandinsky.
4. Collegial Analysis: Reaching a Consensus
The most significant opportunity to reduce the Supreme Court's
caseload may ultimately be through disciplined opinion writing and
collegial deference in the rendering of decisions. In selecting cases for
review, the Court should consider whether members of the Court are
prepared to work together to clarify and advance the state of the law.
The subtle judgments and mutual deference involved in this process
spring from the Court's deeply embedded traditions and the practical
wisdom of its finest members. One such great exemplar was Justice
Brandeis, of whom his former law clerk, Paul Freund, has written:
greater protection to a citizen than is required by the Constitution. Id. at 3489-90.
Justice Stevens wrote:
Even if I agreed with the Court that we are free to consider as a fresh
proposition whether we may take presumptive jurisdiction over the deci-
sions of sovereign states, I could not agree that an expansive attitude makes
good sense. It appears to be common ground that any rule we adopt should
show "respect for state courts, and [a] desire to avoid advisory opinions."
.. . And I am confident that all members of this Court agree that there is a
vital interest in the sound management of scarce federal judicial resources.
All of those policies counsel against the exercise of federal jurisdiction. They
are fortified by my belief that a policy of judicial restraint-one that allows
other decisional bodies to have the last word in legal interpretation until it is
truly necessary for this Court to intervene-enables this Court to make its
most effective contribution to our federal system of government.
The nature of the case before us hardly compels a departure from tradi-
tion. These are not cases in which an American citizen has been deprived of
a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute.
Rather, they are cases in which a state court has upheld a citizen's assertion
of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal and state
law. The complaining party is an officer of the state itself, who asks us to
rule that the state court interpreted federal rights too broadly and "overpro-
tected" the citizen. ...
Until recently we had virtually no interest in cases of this type. ...
Sometime during the past decade. . . our priorities shifted. The result is a
docket swollen with requests by states to reverse judgments that their courts
have rendered in favor of their citizens. I am confident that a future Court
will recognize the error of this allocation of resources. When that day
comes, I think it likely that the court will also reconsider the propriety of
today's expansion of our jurisdiction.
Id. at 3490-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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For Brandeis almost the paramount quality of a good judge was
the capacity to be reached by reason, the freedom from self-pride
that without embarrassment permits a change of mind. It was this
quality of open-mindedness which made Justice Pitney, who was in
many respects poles apart from Brandeis, an especially respected
colleague. The constructive influence of Brandeis in the councils of
the Court owed much to his high boiling point, his self-control
which, when excessively taxed, was able to convert the fire within
him into the heat of dry ice. 36
The unpublished opinions of Justice Brandeis, as analyzed by Alex-
ander Bickel, provide useful insight into the collegial decision-making
of past Courts and the judgment involved in deciding whether to
dissent. 137 Brandeis had been assigned to write the Court's opinion in
St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Starbird,13s
concerning the question whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
to review a state court's decision if a federal right had not been
expressly asserted in the state court below. Brandeis wrote a draft
opinion denying jurisdiction, but several months later Justice Day
issued a unanimous opinion for the Court finding jurisdiction and
addressing the merits. Why did Brandeis not dissent? Bickel asserts
that Brandeis "suppressed his dissenting views on questions which he
considered to be of no great consequence.' 1 39 Similarly, although
Brandeis disagreed with the majority in Gooch v. Oregon Short Line
Railroad Co.,140 he refrained from dissenting on the grounds that the
issue presented-whether a railroad pass condition restricted a per-
sonal injury claim-was "not important enough to warrant dis-
sent."
14 1
In Starbird, it is also likely that Brandeis wished to find a more
effective context in which to articulate his jurisdictional views, and
that he further recognized that a dissent could have focused more
sharply the holding with which he differed. As Professor Frankfurter
once said: "[T]he scope of a Supreme Court decision is not infre-
quently revealed by the candor of dissent.' ' 42 Brandeis "suppressed
dissents for tactical reasons"'43 and often "referred to Holmes' reluc-
136. Freund, Introduction to A. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis at xx (1957).
137. See A. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis passim
(1957) [hereinafter cited as A. Bickel III.
138. 243 U.S. 592 (1917).
139. A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 28.
140. 258 U.S. 22 (1922).
141. A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 28.
142. F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite
106 (1937) (quoted in A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 29).
143. A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 18. Occasionally, however, a dissent may be
used tactically to attempt to narrow the precedential value of a decision. Justice
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tance to dissent again after he had once had his say on a subject.' 144
The Court has often performed magnificently in adjusting the views
of its members to avoid dissension on great public issues, particularly
when unanimity was important to gain public acceptance. The nation
should greatly admire and appreciate the effort, time and talent
which was expended in fashioning a single Court opinion in, inter
alia, Brown v. Board of Education,145 Brown v. Board of Education
11,146 Cooper v. Aaron,147 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,148 United States v. Nixon, 149 and in achieving near-una-
nimity (8-1) in Bob Jones University v. United States.150
While these cases demonstrate that the Court sometimes has strug-
gled mightily for consensus, there is little public indication that the
traditional spirit of collegial deference pervades the Court today.
Indeed, as the statistics cited earlier 15' indicate, unanimous decisions
may be becoming an "endangered species." Carefully crafted and
sparingly used dissents can contribute to the sharpness of the Court's
message and even foreshadow its future direction. 152 In some in-
stances, a clear and forceful opinion of the Court accompanied by
equally lucid and scholarly concurring and dissenting opinions can
provide both clarity and realism in evaluating the underlying societal
tensions. The Chief Justice's eloquent opinion for the Court in Immi-
gration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,15 3 Justice Powell's lucid
Brennan's recent dissent in Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983), offers a not
too subtle illustration:
Although I disagree with today's holding, it is worth stressing how ex-
traordinarily narrow it is, and how empty of likely precedental value....
Hence, although in my view the Court reaches the wrong result in the case
at hand, it is unlikely that any future plaintiffs challenging a state reappor-
tionment scheme as unconstitutional will be so unwise as to limit their
challenge ....
Id. at 2700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 18.
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The case was first argued on December 9, 1952 but was
not decided until May 17, 1954. Id. at 483.
146. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
147. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
148. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
149. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
150. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
151. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
152. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 531, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "Fundamen-
tally Unnecessary and lll Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835, 838 (1973). Justice Brennan's
concern that he may not be able to suggest through dissent from a denial of certiorari
that substantial issues are presented, id., is countered by Justice Stevens' contention
that the Supreme Court "shouldn't waste scarce time and energies writing dissents
when it denies petitions for review." Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1978, at A12, col. 1.
153. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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concurring opinion, and Justice White's scholarly dissent each con-
tribute to public understanding of the legislative veto issue and the
true tensions inherent in any future attempt at a legislative solution.
The Court, however, must confront "that 'great difficulty of all
group action'-when to dissent, and when to concede and be si-
lent." 154 While concurring opinions may contribute to the develop-
ment of the law, concurrences such as the one filed by Justice O'Con-
nor in Commissioner v. Tufts' 55 do little to sharpen the Court's
holding. After reciting at length from Professor Barnett's amicus brief,
Justice O'Connor concluded: "Persuaded though I am by the logical
coherence and internal consistency of this approach, I agree with the
Court's decision not to adopt it judicially."'' 56 Such persistent fragmen-
tation of views and lack of cohesion erode the Court's moral authority,
befuddle the beneficiaries of its guidance, and-most relevant here-
invite further pressure on its workload.
The confusion begat by fragmentation can be illustrated by the
Court's recent decision on the fourth amendment's protection against
illegal search and seizure in Florida v. Royer. 157 Mr. Royer had pur-
chased an airline ticket to New York City at Miami Airport under the
name "Holt" and had checked two suitcases bearing this appella-
tion. 158 In the airport concourse, a nervous Royer was approached by
two detectives who had observed him and believed that he fit the so-
called "drug courier profile."'' 59 Upon request, but without oral con-
sent, Royer produced his airline ticket and driver's license, the latter
of which bore his correct name. 160 The detectives then informed Royer
that they were narcotics investigators and they suspected he was
transporting narcotics. 16' Without returning his ticket or license, they
asked him to accompany them to a small room adjacent to the con-
course where they retrieved his luggage and requested his consent to
search it. 16 2 Royer did not orally consent but provided a key which
unlocked one of the suitcases in which marijuana was found. 6 3
This is not a unique set of circumstances. Last year, in the Detroit
Airport alone, drugs were found in 77 out of 141 searches. 64 Because
narcotics smuggling is a serious national problem, clear Supreme
154. A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 21.
155. 103 S. Ct. 1826, 1836 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 1837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
158. Id. at 1322.
159. Id. at 1321-22.
160. Id. at 1322.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1339 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court guidance would be helpful to law enforcement officials and to
the lower courts.
It is instructive, therefore, to examine the "guidance" the Court
provided through its five separate opinions.16 s In a plurality opinion,
Justice White concluded that Royer's detention in the airport con-
course was legal, but that his removal to the small room constituted an
illegal detention. 166 Thus, although Royer consented to the search of
his luggage, the consent was tainted by the illegal detention, and
therefore ineffective to justify the search.167 Justice Powell concurred,
but concluded that in the "small, windowless room-described as a
'large closet' "168 Royer's mere surrender of his luggage key did not
constitute consent. 16 9 Concurring in the result, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the initial stop of Royer in the airport concourse was
illegal and that everything thereafter was therefore tainted. 170 Justice
Blackmun dissented, arguing that society's interest in the detection of
drug traffickers is so great that the detectives did not need to have
"probable cause" to detain Royer.17 1 Justice Rehnquist, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, also dissented, concluding that
under the circumstances the two detectives did have "probable cause"
to arrest Royer and that the transfer to a small room and interception
of the luggage were consistent with the fourth amendment's "reason-
ableness test.' '1 72
Despite the five opinions, a law enforcement officer, prosecuting or
defense attorney, or lower court has no clear answer to many impor-
tant questions. For instance, should the law enforcement officers have
requested permission to search the suitcases in the open public con-
course rather than transfering Royer to a small room? If the room had
been large and spacious, rather than small and windowless, would the
officers' conduct have been reasonable? If the officers had returned
Royer's ticket and driver's license, would the encounter have been
consensual? If Royer had orally agreed to open the suitcase, would
this have been sufficient?
The Supreme Court's resolution of the Royer case, some might say,
represents the intellectual jousting of a debating society, each Justice
165. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion of White, J., at
1321; concurring opinion of Powell, J., at 1329; concurring opinion of Brennan, J.,
at 1330; dissenting opinion of Blackmun, J., at 1332; dissenting opinion of
Rehnquist, J., at 1336).
166. Id. at 1326.
167. Id. at 1326-27.
168. Id. at 1330 (Powell, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1331-32 (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 1332. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1337 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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spinning his own web of procedural distinctions from the Court's
esoteric fourth amendment jurisprudence. 17 3 It fails to exhibit any
collegial attempt at consensus on basic principles. It is devoid of real
guidance for officers and lawyers, and invites further litigation to
resolve the ambiguities it has created. Furthermore, having upheld a
similar airport drug search in 1980 in United States v. Mendenhall,174
the Supreme Court was not under any compulsion to revisit the
issue. 175
The Supreme Court should have denied certiorari in Royer. If it did
not become apparent until after certiorari was granted that the case
did not present the best opportunity to revisit the issue of airport drug
searches, the Supreme Court could have disposed of the case summar-
ily in a per curiam affirmance of the judgment below (perhaps stating
that an opinion would not be written because there was no consensus
on the issue). Alternatively, the Court should have admitted its mis-
take in granting certiorari and reversed the grant. The Court's action
in Illinois v. Gates,17 for example, despite criticism from the press,17 7
was clearly correct. The Justices simply announced that the Court
would not rule on the controversial law enforcement questions pre-
sented because "[t]hey had picked the wrong case.' 178
A month after Royer, the Supreme Court, in a similar display of
fragmentation, applied the "plain view" doctrine to a police officer's
seizure of a drug-filled green party balloon from respondent's automo-
bile. 79 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White and Justice O'Connor, maintained that seizure of the balloon
did not constitute a violation of the fourth amendment. 180 Justice
Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred, arguing that the plain
view doctrine articulated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire'" was dis-
173. See Will, Justice Squints, Wash. Post, Mar. 31, 1983, at A23, col. 5.
174. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
175. Subsequent to Royer, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in an
airport drug seizure case. In United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983), six
Justices were able to agree that detaining a suspect's luggage for over 90 minutes was
not reasonable in the absence of probable cause. In contrast to Royer, this case is a
good example of the type of clear guidance a more cohesive opinion can provide.
176. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). The issue in Gates was whether the exclusionary rule
should be modified to allow the introduction of illegally obtained evidence, when
that evidence was obtained in the good faith belief that the search and seizure in
question complied with the requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at 2321. The
Court declined to decide this issue because it had not been presented to or decided by
the Illinois Court. Id.
177. See, e.g., Barbash, High Court Feared Issuing the Right Ruling in the Wrong
Case, Wash. Post, June 10, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
178. Id.
179. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
180. Id. at 1541-44.
181. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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positive of the issue presented.182 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, wrote a separate concurring opinion pointing
out that the state would have to justify opening the balloon without a
warrant before the balloon's contents could be used as evidence. 183 In
a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice White noted his continued dis-
agreement with the views of four Justices in Coolidge that plain view
seizures are only valid if inadvertent. 8 4 Although there were no dis-
sents, the four separate opinions, none of which reflected the views of
a Court majority, completely diffused the practical value of any
guidance provided by the Court.
Perhaps the classic example of fragmentation occurred in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.'85 Two different five-to-four
majorities decided the two main issues in the case, 186 resulting in six
separate opinions. 187 Even though Justices Marshall, White and Black-
mun joined Justice Brennan in his opinion, they each also wrote their
own separate opinions."" The resultant 156 pages left the law regard-
ing affirmative action in medical school admissions in a state of rea-
soned ambiguity.
The substantial increase in the number of separate opinions in cases
like Royer, Brown, and Bakke adds fuel to the flames of a litigious
population by inviting litigants throughout the federal system to press
for particular points of view that have some support on the Court. 8 '
As the statistics recited earlier' 90 suggest, there is less cohesion and
unity of purpose on today's Court. Some of this dissension may be
explained by the diversity of backgrounds and perspectives on the
present Court, the increased complexity of the social and technical
182. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1544-45 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 1544 (White, J., concurring).
185. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
186. Id. at 271-72; see Tribe, Comment, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection,
Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 864, 864 (1979).
187. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Opinion of
Powell, J., at 269; opinion of Brennan, J., Marshall, J., White, J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 324; opinion of White, J., at 379;
opinion of Marshall, J., at 387; opinion of Blackmun, J., at 402; opinion of Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 408).
188. See supra note 187.
189. See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1982, at Al, col. 2. In the 1981 Term, 33 cases were
decided by a one-vote margin as compared to the previous Term in which 17 cases
were decided by a one-vote margin. Id. In the 1982 Term, 33 cases were decided by a
one-vote margin. See Appendix, Chart I.
190. Between 1955 and 1982, the Supreme Court issued approximately "three
times as many plurality decisions ds were issued in the entire previous history of the
Court." Wallace, supra note 97, at 921 (citing Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial
Decisionmakings, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1127 n.1, 1147 (1981)).
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issues that are presented to the Court today (in contrast to the Courts
on which Hughes, Holmes and Brandeis sat), and the tendency of
Congress to "punt" on too many controversial issues. But the outside
observer sees too little evidence of a genuine effort by the Justices to
work out their differences in conference rather than spell them out in
separate opinions. ,91 Ironically, the Supreme Court, as Justice Frank-
furter reminded us, derives its authority not from the exercise of
power or control of the purse, but through its capacity to gain the
consent of the governed to a reasoned, ordered process of dispute
resolution. ,0 2
It does little to aid the Court's image as the ultimate dispute resolver
when the Justices themselves cannot refrain from engaging in attacks
on one another's positions. An example of this sort of internal bicker-
ing is the five-to-four decision in FERC v. Mississippi.19 3 Justice Black-
mun, writing for the Court, referred to Justice O'Connor's "purported
distinctions" as "little more than exercises in the art of ipse dixit."' 94
Justice O'Connor, in her partial dissent, referred to Justice Black-
mun's choice between the states' abandoning regulation of public
utilities or complying with a federal statute as "an absurdity, for if
[the] analysis is sound, the Constitution no longer limits federal regu-
lation of state governments." 95 Justice Blackmun recently noted that
on such close votes, "[y]ou're locked in combat. It's competitive to
that degree .... But I think, clearly, this is an educational process-
and I would hope that one matures as the years go by."'' 6
There are, of course, times when a clear and forceful dissent con-
tributes greatly to public understanding of the law, but dissents
should be saved for such occasions. One should not advocate that the
fiercely independent intellects that constitute today's Supreme Court
consign themselves to the lowest common denominator of compro-
mise. Nor should attempts at accommodation resort to intentional
ambiguities like the legislative ambiguities created by House-Senate
conferences. If clarity and candor are best served by dissenting opin-
ions, then a dissent is preferable to disingenuous accommodation.
191. Unless the Justices routinely employ tact and diplomacy in order to establish
convincing majorities, court decisions may resemble a "restricted railroad ticket,
good for this day and train only." See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting). See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
192. See N. Dawson, Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and the New Deal 27-
28 (1980).
193. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
194. Id. at 762 n.27.
195. Id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 20.
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Often unanimity is not obtained by scientists, even on matters subject
to objective proof. One cannot expect that the Justices will always
achieve harmonious consent on difficult philosophical, economic, and
governmental matters. As Chief Justice Hughes stated in 1936:
How amazing it is that, in the midst of controversies on every
conceivable subject, one should expect unanimity of opinion upon
difficult legal questions! In the highest ranges of thought, in theol-
ogy, philosophy and science, we find differences of view on the
part of the most distinguished experts, -theologians, philosophers
and scientists. The history of scholarship is a record of disagree-
ments. And when we deal with questions relating to principles of
law and their application, we do not suddenly rise into a strato-
sphere of icy certainty. 197
But the heritage of the law-particularly the common law-is that
objective neutral principles can be applied by well-trained lawyers to
reach a correct judgment. It would be less than candid not to suggest
that the Supreme Court could do much to reduce the pressures of its
workload if the Justices would work a little harder at reaching agree-
ment with each other and a little less hard at writing separate opin-
ions.
Paul Freund's description of Justice Brandeis' approach to decision-
making illustrates a tradition that has much meaning for today's
Court:
Brandeis exploited to the full the resources available to a judge
.... He was not an addict of speed in the work of the Supreme
Court. Unlike a Holmes or a Cardozo, he was not impatient to
turn off an opinion while the frenzy was on him so much as he was
anxious that it persuade and instruct. Time for research, documen-
tation, reflection, and the architecture of an opinion was indispen-
sable .... [H]e made a practice of distributing his own drafts early
in the week, holding them over if necessary lest they reach the
brethren too near the time for decision .... What emerges from all
this is the image of a judge whose strength lay in his power to blend
tradition and change, to find in the heritage of the law resources
adequate to the needs of the new day, if only there is imagination
to see the resources and understanding to see the needs....
The willingness, indeed the temperamental inclination, of Bran-
deis to work within the received framework of the law, is a clue to
his effectiveness in the collective task of decision-making.9 8
197. Address of Chief Justice Hughes, 13 Proc. Am. Litigation Inst. 61, 64 (1936),
quoted in P. Freund, supra note 2, at 117 n.2.
198. Freund, Introduction to A. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis at xviii-xix (1957).
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CONCLUSION
It is truly ironic for one who feels so deeply that the Court has
consistently discharged its constitutional responsibility with more
judgment, style and foresight than any other institution of govern-
ment to suggest any criticism whatsoever. When the President and
Congress avoided the issues, the Court had the courage and foresight
to end racial segregation in the public school system, to come to grips
with the right of a woman to have an abortion, to recognize that sex
discrimination is unacceptable in a constitutional democracy, and to
insist upon a fair criminal process. Anyone who knows American
history must concede that the Court has performed with a higher
standard of excellence than any other institution, state or federal, in
this constitutional democracy. The libraries at Oxford, Cambridge
and Harvard undoubtedly contain more critical theses about Shakes-
peare or Pushkin than any minor writers or poets; the Court must
accept the fact that institutions that excel are the subject of continuing
critical pressure to attain even greater standards of excellence-per-
haps because they are the repository of so many of civilized society's
aspirations. In that spirit this conclusion is written.
Much of the answer to the workload problem lies not in the estab-
lishment of new institutions but deep in the traditions of the Supreme
Court. Congress should give the Court discretion to choose only those
few issues of fundamental national importance for review, delegating
to the circuit courts the power to resolve lesser conflicts. Like a
microcosm of the larger society it reflects, the Supreme Court's success
depends on it taking those limited issues and weaving the diverse
strands of a complex society into a cohesive fabric. Thus, the ultimate
objective in the management of the Supreme Court's caseload should
be to provide the Justices with the freedom to grapple together as wise
individualists in search of common principles rooted in the unfulfilled
vision of our Constitution. It is a disciplined search which cautions
against needless dissent and pointless contention. As Alexander Bickel
has said, society "values the capacity of the judges to draw its atten-
tion to issues of largest principle that may have gone unheeded in the
welter of its pragmatic doings."' 9
199. A. Bickel I, supra note 110, at 177.
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CHART I
STATISTICS: SUPREME COURT OPINIONS*
1. Total Court Opinions**
-Per Curiam
2. Concurring Opinions
-Concurrences as
a percentage of
total opinions
3. Dissenting Opinions
-Dissents as a
percentage of
total opinions
4. Total Separate Opinions
-Separate opinions
as a percentage of
total opinions
5. Unanimous Decisions
-Unanimous decisions
as a percentage of
total opinions
6. Five-to-Four Votes
-Five-to-four votes
as a percentage of
total opinions
1882
260
0
4
1.55%
17
6.58%
21
8.13%
242
93.08%
4
1.55%
1932
167
1
4
2.39%
1982
151
11
70
46.35%
24 144
14.37% 95.36%
28 214
16.76% 141.72%
133
79.64%
3
1.79%
34
22.52%
33
21.85%
* Figures for 1882 and 1932 Terms were compiled by the author's
staff from U.S. Reports for those Terms. Figures for the 1982 Term
were obtained from the Harvard Law Review and will be published
in The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. (1983).
* * Does not include per curiam opinions.
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CHART II
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: OPINIONS WRITTEN*
Term
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
1950
1949
1948
Opinions of
the Court
151
141
122
132
130
129
126
138
123
140
140
129
106
83
99
110
100
97
91
111
110
84
109
96
98
96
100
73
78
65
104
83
91
87
114
* Source: The Supreme Court: The Statistics, 63-97 Harv. L. Rev.,
November issues (1949-1983). These figures do not include per curiam
opinions.
Concurrences
70
95
91
79
78
81
91
89
51
57
67
69
82
52
67
75
26
37
46
30
40
31
42
26
30
23
18
21
15
16
32
19
23
18
37
Dissents
140
135
119
156
122
143
140
126
101
142
178
130
115
70
101
91
97
74
71
77
76
66
111
99
72
93
83
55
47
57
89
73
60
64
93
Total
361
371
332
367
330
353
357
353
275
339
385
328
303
205
267
276
223
208
208
218
226
181
\262
221
200
212
211
149
140
138
225
182
174
169
244
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CHART III
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: NUMBER OF OPINIONS*
400
380
340
300
260
220
180
10 C0)O CS 0 CO cc r- 00 0
* Source: The Supreme Court: The Statistics, 63-97 Harv. L. Rev.,
November issues (1950-1983). These figures do not include per curiam
opinions.
